The common law favours the imposition of strict formality requirementson land transactions. If LP (MP) act 1989 s2 is not complied withthere is no contract.
Without a deed Legal estates and interestscannot be created or transferred under the LPA 1925 S52(1). Trustsof land can only be created by signed declarations in writing LPA 1925s53(1)(b). The strictness of these requirements can sometimes ends ininjustice, notably where relationships break down and the ownership ofthe property they share comes under scrutiny. This is outlined in theDiscussion paper of shared homes. The decisions in some cases in thisarea of law has led to confusion.Order now
The paper comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to have astatutory framework in this area, and we must see if the decision inHiscock has clarified this. In the Journal of social welfare andfamily law, an article titled ‘a law commission discussion paper witha difference’ is the criticism of the law commission discussion paperexamining the legal rights of cohabitants in property. It states it‘regrets its lack of consultation and its failure to make suggestionsfor reform and its adoption of a property law rather than a family lawapproach to the problem’. Previous cases, before Oxley have been contradictory in there natureand have never set a conclusive framework. Under the LPA 1925 S53 (1)(b) an express trust is unenforceable unless evidenced in writing buts53 (2) provides that this requirement does not affect the operationof resulting, implied or constructive trusts.
In the previous cases itwas the imposition of these trusts that caused the confusion. In the early 1970’s, the House of Lords had to consider two cases inwhich the claim of a divorced spouse to a share in the family home,was not based on financial contribution, but on the work done in thehouse (Pettit v Pettit), and on relatively minor contributions tohousehold expenses (Gissing v Gissing). This latter case isimportant and set out the requirements for the modern common intentiontrust. In Gissing, Lord Diplock set out that there was a two stage inestablishing a common intention trust of this sort . 1) an agreement 2)some detrimental reliance on this agreement.
There must be agreementbetween the parties at the time the property was acquired and that thepartner without the legal estate is to have beneficial interest in theland. Such an agreement can be made in writing or orally, which thecourt may still be able to infer agreement from the conduct of one ofthe parties. Inferred intention may be by, contribution to mortgageinstalments, price of property, deposit or legal charges, indirectmortgage payments such as paying bills to free money up of themortgage payer. If the agreement is made in writing as mentioned above the agreementwould constitute a declaration of trust for the purposes of LPA 1925S53 (1)(b). Some cases illustrating written agreement are Eves v Eves,and Grant v Edwards. If the agreement made orally or it had to beinferred from conduct it would be unenforceable unless the court couldfind in implied, resulting or constructive trust, an example of thiswould be Midland Bank v Cooke.
Diplock’s second requirement that the claimant had been induced to actto their detriment in belief that they are acquiring an interest. InGissing this is suggested could be the same as those noted above fromwhich an agreement may be inferred, but in later decision it wasaccepted a wider range of contribution which did not involve financialcontribution. In the case of Gissing the House of Lords considered there was noevidence of any express agreement between the parties at the time thehouse was bought and nor were the contributions of the wife sufficientto support the interference of a common intention. There was nobeneficial interest.
The immediate result (of the court of appeal decision where theactions of the wife were accepted), of this decision was an increaseuse of this non express trust to achieve a fair result between partieswhen a strict application of legal rules would appear inequitable. Lord Denning, who had his own interpretation of Gissing read LordDiplocks words as authorising the use of the new model constructivetrust wherever it was equitable to do so. However in view of the morerestrictive approach adopted by the Court of Appeal from the mid1980’s onwards in now seems improbable that Lord Denning’s broadapproach will have much influence today. Accordingly these are a fewof his decisions. These are four cases where in an unmarried situationthey upheld the plaintiffs claim to a share in the house owned by thepartner.
These claims would be an unlikely occurrence today. Cooke vHead, Eves v Eves, Hall v Hall, Hussey v Palmer. A Change of approach was again adopted, as mentioned above, in the mid80’s, seen in Burns v Burns when an unmarried couple had beenliving together for 19yrs – she cared for the kids and paid the billsand it was held not to be an inferred common intention. On theapproach adopted by Lord Denning (eg Hall v Hall) one would havethought these facts would have amounted to some sort of implied trust,but the Court of Appeal followed Diplock’s views in Gissingemphasising need for agreement. The change is also shown in the case of Lloyds TSB bank v Rossettwhere the husband bought house with trust money.
The result maywell have restated the decision in Gissing, but the second paragraph,of the need for direct contribution seems to limit the scope of theprinciples as so far understood, and to rule out the indirectcontribution to mortgage repayments by meeting household expenseswhich was accepted in Gissing and Burns. It is in describing the confusion of past law, that we must look atthe most recent case of Oxley v Hiscock- an unmarried coupleseparated and the ownership of the house again came into question. Theresult was that they ‘got out what they put’ although the woman madecontributions in other ways. The lady wanted a constructive trust toarise and therefore get equal shares. The judge must look at the viewof overall fairness so although cohabitation had involved a classicpooling of resources, Hiscock’s greater financial contribution had tobe take into account and an equal split would therefore not be fair. If there is a common intention to share, must look at whole course ofdealing.
The question is whether this decision has clarified the somewhatunstable law that has been occurring previously. A Journal ArticleTitled ‘Property rights in a family home’ from the Family Law journalwelcomes the Court of Appeal decision in Oxley which clarifies theprinciples to be applied when deciding upon the property interests inthe family home in the absence of an express agreement as to itsdivision. It contrasts the previously conflicting approaches inSpringette v Defoe where the property was divided into proportionsequal to the parties’ contributions and considered Midland v Cookewhere it was held that the parties’ total conduct relating to theproperty would be taken in to account in deciding a fair decision. It seems that the case has given stability to some extent in decisionsin shared homes when separation occurs, as the recent decision inOxley states that the whole course of dealing must be looked at andthe result must be fair.
In Gissing it was decided that after 30 yearsof marriage there should be no beneficial interest, which surely wasnot fair. Although there are now some guidelines that have arisen fromthis case, I would conclude that the clarification of the law is onlyto a certain extent as the aggrieved party may sill feel cheated aftera long period of marriage and only a small share of the house. Part 2ScenarioQuestion 1 – Will the Children’s trust fund include any share inRyburn?Mohan and Wendy have bought Ryburn which is a large house for £350000and they were beneficial joint tenants with no restrictions wereentered onto the proprietorship register. Wendy contributed £175 000towards the purchase price, Mohan £100000 and they borrowed £75000.
The express declaration of trust in the transfer deed is conclusive asto the nature of their co-ownership (and would be as to the size oftheir respective shares in the case of a Tenancy in Common). They are both in legal ownership. To enter in a joint tenancy Wendywould have been aware that although she put in more of the money, ifthey were ever to sever the Joint tenancy she would only receive halfof the trust property rather than the 60% that she put in unlessexpressly declared otherwise. They own the property together, not inshares.
As joint tenants there were four unities that must haveexisted when entering in to the tenancy. These are Time Title interestand possession. This means that they should vest in the property atthe same time, have acquired the title of the property by the samemeans, their interests must be the same and they must be equallyentitled to the possession. A crucial aspect of the joint tenancymeans there is a right of survivorship or jus accrescendi on the deathof one of the parties which means the surviving party would inheritthe whole of the trust property. It cannot be disposed of in a will tosomeone else, nor will it pass on intestacy if no will is made.
Thelast survivor becomes the sole beneficiary. A tenancy in common means the parties hold a share of the property,usually the amount of money they put into the purchase price. In thissituation only one unity is needed, and that is the unity ofpossession, however there can be other unities present. If possessiondid not exist there would be no co ownership.
It allows a notionalshare of the property. If all the unities are present, ‘words ofseverance’ may indicate a Tenancy in Common. This means the agreementof co-ownership would contain words such as ‘in equal shares’ orequally’ as in the case of Payne v Webb. It is the ‘right of survivorship’ that is the important aspectregarding the children’s share in Ryburn.
If Mohan and Wendy werestill joint tenants when Mohan died the property will belong to Wendyas Mohan will not have been able to leave it in a will to hischildren. If they were Tenants in common, the children would receivehalf share or the equivalent to the amount Mohan put in to thepurchase of the house. Wendy has met Peter and they have fallen in love, and they would liketo move in together. All Wendy’s money is tied up in her share of thehouse and so she has emailed him asking to buy her share and if hewon’t agree to then put the house on the market and split the priceequally. This would mean a severance of the joint tenancy and thisprinciple is shown in the case of Goodman v Gallant. A primaryreason for severance of a joint tenancy is to avoid the effects of theright of survivorship.
Due to the Law of Property Act 1925 S36(2) itis not possible to sever a legal joint tenancy, this is, howeverpossible in Equity, making the tenancy a Tenancy in Common. This isaffected in a number of ways set out in the proviso of s 36(2). In this case we must therefore establish if there has been severanceof the joint tenancy making it a tenancy in common and this willdecide what share the children recieve a share in Ryburn. This wouldmean showing if the email has amounted to severance of this jointtenancy, which if it has would mean that Wendy cannot receive the fullproperty on right of survivorship but only a share of the property,therefore leaving Mohan’s children with the rest.
There are several ways of severing a joint tenancy. The first way isby notice in writing. It is then necessary to decide whether the emailthat Wendy sent to Mohan could be classed as a notice in writing asMohan did not actually read the email before he died. Due to this weshould make reference to Land Property Act s 196. The LPA 196(4) setsout that severance letters left at the last known ‘place of abode oraddress’ are sufficient notice. If this service is adopted it isirrelevant that the owner does not in fact receive knowledge of thenotice as shown in the case of Re 88 Berkley Road.
Alternativelythe notice can be sent by registered post and if not returnedundelivered LPA 196(3) (as shown in Kinch v Bullard) can be heldto be severance by notice in writing. If this was to apply here thenthere would be severance due to this email, as it was left at Mohan’slast know email address which is obviously still in use as Mohandecided not to read the email before he went to his dinner. It couldalso be argued that is was registered when it was sent, as all emailscan be traced and it was not returned undelivered as a failed deliveryreport would have been sent to Wendy’s inbox. It is also possible to sever a joint tenancy by ‘acts of otherthings’.
Williams v Hensman set out the requirements for severanceof a Joint tenancy in this manner. This could be by ‘An act operatingupon his own share’ for example on sale, mutual agreement, orforfeiture. In this situation there could be severance by mutualagreement. As both parties have discussed for the past couple ofmonths to sell the house this could also amount to severance by mutualagreement.
Mutual agreement occurs in the case of Burgess v Rawnsley. Finally there must also be a clear intention to sever immediately asin Harris v Goddard. This is stated in the email as Wendy wantseverything to be sorted as soon as possible and therefore put on themarket right away. It may be said that this does not amount to severance as the LPA s196does not apply to emails and it is not deemed to be held as severanceby notice in writing as the email was not read before Mohan died. Inmy opinion looking at the facts and applying the law, I would say thatthe tenancy has been severed and therefore leaving the childrenMohan’s share of the property. Question 2 – What legal issues are raised by Maria’s acquisition of a25% shareholding in VPC ltd?Mohan, before he died had set up a pharmaceutical company with hiscousin Raman and his sister Pushpa and has died a wealthy man.
He lefthis entire estate to his three children Sachin who is 24, poppy who is20, 21 in April and Rahul who is 16, and they must receive the moneywhen they reach 30 years old. Raman, Pushpa and Maria, Mohan’ssolicitor are the trustees. The trustees have taken over a pharmaceuticals company called VPC, andMaria after telling the other Trustees, has bought some shares in VPCrealising that after the takeover they will probably increase inprice. The trustees must do the best for the trust property and investmoney wisely.
The decision to sell the shares to Maria is therefore aninvestment decision which the trustees should make. If it transpiresthat they should not have sold the shares, or sold them earlier tomake a profit then the beneficiaries may have an action for breach oftrust. They will have to show that there was a breach which was afailure to exercise reasonable care and skill in managing investmentsand that breach has caused a loss. Target Holdings Ltd v Redfern. A case where there was insufficient care in the investment is in thecase of Nestle v Nat west Bank.
The fact that Maria has bought the shares is another matteraltogether. As outlined in Bray v Ford there is an inflexible ruleon persons in a fiduciary duty that they can not make a profit andthey are not allowed to put themselves ‘in a position where hisinterest and duty conflict’. Where any person in a fiduciary positionobtains a profit or gain by virtue of that position he may not keep itfor himself but will be liable for it to the person to whom he is afiduciary. How do we know if there is a fiduciary relationship? The most obviousis that of a trustee and beneficiary, it is clear that a trustee mustnot put there personal interests in conflict with those of the trust.
This principle is shown in the case of Keech v Sandford. Theparticular fiduciary relationship in this case is beneficiary andtrustee, but in the course of time the principle of fiduciaryrelationships has been extended to other fiduciary relationships suchas agents, tenants for life, tenancy in Common and Joint tenants. This means Maria is in a fiduciary relationship and is in breach ofher duty as the purchase of trust property by a trustee invokes therule against self dealing, a specific application of the overridingfiduciary obligation not to profit from the fiduciary position or putoneself in a position where personal interest and a duty to thebeneficiaries may conflict. The core principles of fiduciaryobligation in a contempory context are set out in the judgement ofBristol & West building society v Mothew .
In any event it doesnot matter if the trustees put their own interests before that of thetrusts because they are in breach of their fiduciary duty by puttingthemselves in a position where there may be a conflict of interesteven though there is no actual conflict. Even if Maria does not make a profit and she bought the shares at afair price and making the other trustees aware, this is still selfdealing and the transaction can be set aside at the request of thebeneficiary as illustrated in Wright v Morgan and Kane v Radley –Kane. The profit made can also be recovered and kept by thebeneficiary as the original money was the beneficiaries. It is a breach of a fiduciary duty if a person in a fiduciary positionmakes a profit from the use of knowledge or economic opportunitygained by the virtue of their position, the rule applies even if theyacted bone fide.
Maria has misused her knowledge of the company andthe shares and knowing their price will increase after the takeover ofVPC, therefore benefiting herself, as illustrated in Walsh v Deloitteand Touche and Boardman v Phipps. There are two basic kinds of remedies available in equity to preventa fiduciary from profiting. The proprietary remedy is to make theunfair gain the subject matter of the trust. This mechanism and itseffect were explained in AG for Hong Kong v Reid in the context ofbribes and as soon as the bribe was received whether in cash or inkind, the false fiduciary held the bribe on constructive trust for theperson injured.
The other remedy which the fiduciary may be deprivedof his unfair gain is to make him personally accountable for it to theperson(s) they are fiduciary to. This is a personal remedy and theymust give up an amount equivalent to the gain, no specific property ismade subject to the trust. In our scenario I think the shares are now held on constructive trustfor the beneficiaries. Also as there has been a considerable profitmade the beneficiaries can insist the shares are resold on the openmarket and the profit transferred to them. The beneficiaries couldalso have the purchase set aside and the property recovered plus anyincome the shares have made in the meantime, or can insist the sharesbeing resold on the open market.
It may be said that there can be no defences to the trustees here, asnone of the beneficiaries are Sui Juris and could agree to this selfdealing. Boardman v Phipps shows this scenario well and theirinvestment in shares was unauthorised even though the other trusteesknow about it, they had not fully disclosed it to the beneficiaries. Maria may say they are acting bone fide in good faith; however shewould have known that she would be gaining from her knowledge and thiswould be likely to fail. In a proprietary remedy there is strictliability for ones own acts or omissions even if acting in good faith. Simpson 1951.
A Trustee, or other person in a fiduciary position, ispersonally liable for his breach of trust of fiduciary duty, or inappropriate cases, for a proprietary remedy. As seen in the case of ReDiplock . Maria will therefore be liable and the shares dealt within the manner the beneficiaries think correct. Question 3 – Advise the three children as to whether Maria, Raman oranybody else may be liable to compensate them for the losses caused bythe withdrawals. Pushpa who is experiencing cash flow problems has started to dip intothe trust fund at Krishna bank to tide her over. She has withdrawn£10000 from the trust account to buy her daughter a wedding present,she withdrew another £50000 and put it in to her own account and onthe advice of her investment consultant frank she withdrew £150000 toinvest in Far Eastern securities.
As Maria and Raman knew at some point about what has been going onand they have not done anything about it. Also they have not paid muchattention to the trust over the past year as they have been overseeingother projects. Therefore if there has been a breach of trust theywill be jointly and severally liable for the loss. Trustees cannotallow trust property to be under exclusive control of one of theirnumber so therefore Maria and Raman must make it their duty to knowwhat is going on at all times.
The trust must remain under control ofthem all and it could be said that control has passed as they were notkeeping an eye on trust money and therefore they have committed abreach of trust. The case of Re Flower states, ‘the duty oftrustees is to prevent one of themselves having the exclusive controlover the money, and certainly not, by any act of theirs, to enable oneof themselves to have exclusive control over it’. Even if it was not proved that Raman and Maria allowed Pushpa fullcontrol over the money, the trustees are still likely to be joint andseverally liable. A trustee cannot avoid liability for anadministrative breach on the basis that they played no active part asin Bahin v Hughes. It is a default of the trustee to fail tosupervise the actions of a co trustee, or to stand by while a cotrustee commits a breach of trust. The trustee must restore to thetrust the assets lost by reason of the breach, or pay the trustsufficient to make up for the loss.
The amount of loss is calculatedat the date of judgement. The Trustee Act 1925 s30(1) provides that notrustee shall be answerable for the acts of the other trustees unlessthe same happens by their own wilful default. It is necessary for the beneficiaries that Raman and Maria’s breachhad a sufficient causative link to the loss to establish liability. There is no liability unless there is a loss and a breach that causedthe loss as in Target v Redfern. We know there is a breach as Pushpahas stolen the money and the other trustees may have caused this asthey were not giving their full attention to the trust. Several defences used by the trustees are, although not stated here,there may be an exemption clause that states the money can be used fortheir own benefit if fully replaced.
However this is unlikely andPushpa took the money for her own use because she was short of money. Exemption clauses are demonstrated in the case of Armitage v Nurse. With an appropriately drafted clause trustees can exempt themselvesfrom anything short of outright dishonesty. However in this case Iwould say it is outright dishonesty. If actions by the beneficiariesto recover trust property are taken after 6 years from the breach thenthe right of action will have ceased. This is under the limitation act1980 s 32(1).
We will presume that the length of time in which thebeneficiaries brought action was less than six years and thereforethis cannot be used as a defence. The consent of a beneficiary who is ‘Sui Juris’ and with fullknowledge consents to or requests to a breach of trust cannot claimagainst the trustee for example Re Paulings. However in thissituation there is no evidence that the beneficiaries were consenting. If it appears to the court that the trustee has acted honestly,reasonably and ought to be fairly excused for a breach of trust or foromitting to obtain the directions of the court then the court mayrelieve the trustee wholly of partly (Trustee Act s61). Also the factthat Trustees have acted upon legal advice does not necessarily meanthey will be excused under s61.
This would mean the advice from Frankwould not necessarily negate liability. However it is unlikely in anyevent that Pushpa would be found acting honestly by her actions. It may be proved that Frank as a stranger to the trust may be liableto compensate the losses which would help recover some of the moneythat has been lost. Accessory liability is formally known as “knowingassistance”. This ground for liability exists where a third partydishonestly participates in a breach of trust by procuring it orfacilitating it.
The primary problem is the meaning of dishonest inthis context. Accessory liability is outlined in Royal Brunei Airlinesv Tan. The issues in this case are whether a third party would beliable for assisting an innocent breach of trust? And what type ofconduct gives rise to third party liability. There is a trust that has arisen as Frank is Pushpa’s investmentconsultant, and is guiding her with her financial matters. In thiscase this is not an innocent breach of trust as Pushpa knows exactlywhat she is doing stealing the money for her own benefit. Frank alsoknows what is going on and therefore assists the dishonesty andinvested in Far Eastern securities.
This shows this his breach causedthe loss, Target v Redfern. The test for accessory liability is an objective test with asubjective element. Not acting as an honest person would be anobjective standard and the subjective element would be what honest andreasonable persons of honest conduct would do in light of what thedefendant knew at the time rather than what an honest and reasonableperson would have known at the time. Turning a blind eye would also bedishonest (Nelsonian) as stated in Gruppo Torras v Al Sabah.
Franks liability depends on his state of mind. So is Frank beingdishonest at the time? If Frank is guilty, a constructive trust isimposed upon them and the likely view is that Frank will be personallyliable to account to the beneficiaries for the amount of loss to theestate which would be the £150000 that Frank advised her about. Frankmay plead honesty and say he didn’t know where the money was comingfrom, but would the court think he was reasonable in doing so?Using a proprietary remedy some of the original money may be able tobe traced. If the money is dissipated then it cannot be traced. Thismay be the case for the £10000 that was spent on Pushpa’s daughterswedding present. Tracing is locating the property in its original formthe beneficiaries seeking to recover it.
It is also the process ofidentifying the value that now represents your original asset. Forexample if the wrongdoer has sold your asset you may be able torecover the money which now represents your asset which in this casewould be the money from the shares. There is common law tracing, wherethe claimant is the legal owner of the trust property, and theclaimants assets have been passed to someone else unlawfully. This canonly be traced if it is in an unchanged form and has not been mixed upwith anything else. This is shown in the case of Lipkin Gorman vKarpnale and FC Jones and sons where it could be traced directlyinto shares.
The money can still be returned even if it has beeninvested. However the money cannot be traced in to a mixed bankaccount at common law which is what regularly happens. The money mustbe claimed in equity if it has been mixed up in used bank accounts. The £500000 that was finally transferred into Pushpa’s bank may befully recovered if none of it has been spent and there is enough moneyin her bank to replace it, even if it takes some of her own money.
Inequity there must be a fiduciary relationship and the money orproperty has been lost through a breach of fiduciary duty. Agip Ltd vJackson. Therefore the money transferred into Pushpa’s own bankaccount may be recoverable through tracing. Any withdrawals arecounted as withdrawing her own money first. In conclusion, Pushpa has stolen the money and is liable to pay backthe losses to the trust. As the money has been used purely by Pushpafor her own benefit on the principle of unjust enrichment, she couldbe held liable to restore the entire amount without any contributionfrom the other trustees.
However this may be of little practical valueto the beneficiaries as it is unlikely that Pushpa has sufficientfunds to reimburse the full amount. However if it is proved that Mariaand Raman also played a part in the breach of trust, they will bejointly and severally liable with all the trustees. Frank as astranger to the trust may also be found to be a cause of the breachand be liable for losses. If some of the money can be traced with aproprietary remedy that that may be found useful by the trustees. Inany event the money needs to be recovered whether if is from Frank orthe trustees who will be jointly and severally liable, or throughtracing. BIBLIOGRAPHY* Pettit v Pettit AC 886* Eves v Eves 1 WLR 1338* Grant v Edwards 1 Ch 638* Midland Balk PLC v Cooke 4 ALL ER 562* Cooke v Head 1 WLR 518* Eves v Eves 3 FLR 379* Hussey v Palmer 1 WLR 1286* Burns v Burns 1 Ch 317* Lloyds TSB bank v Rossett 1 AC 107* Oxley v Hiscock 2004 EWCA Civ 546* Springette v Defoe (1992) 2 FLR 388* Gillett v Holt Ch 210* Barlow, A.
(2003) Sharing homes: a Law Commission Discussion paperwith a difference. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law , 25(1), 83-96. Available from:* Payne v Webb (1874) LR 19 Eq 26)* Goodman v Gallant Fam 106* Re 88 Berkley Road 1971 CH 648* Kinch v Bullard 1999 1 WLR 423* Williams v Hensman (1861) 1 John & H 546* Burgess v Rawnsley Ch 429* Harris v Goddard 1 WLR* Target Holdings Ltd v Redfern 1995 3 WLR 352* Nestle v Nat west Bank 1994 1 ALL ER 118* Bray v Ford (1986) AC 44* Keech v Sandford 1926 Sel Cas Temp King 61* Bristol & West building society v Mothew * Wright v Morgan 1926 AC 788* Kane v Radley – kane 1998 3 ALL ER 753* AG for Hong Kong v Reid 1994 1 AC 324* Re Diplock Ch 456* Boardman v Phipps 1967 2 AC 46* Re Flower (1884) 27 ChD592* Bahin v Hughes 1886 31 chd 390* Re Paulings 1964 ch 303* Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan 1995 3 ALL ER 97* Gruppo Torras v Al Sabah CA 2000 ALL ER 1643* Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale and FC Jones and sons 2 AC 548* Agip Ltd v Jackson Ch 547* Westlaw (2005) Westlaw online http://web2. westlaw.
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(2004) Property rights in a family Home. Family LawJournal , January, pp 524-527, Available from:<www.lawtel.co.uk> .——————————————————————— Law of Property (Miscellaneous provisions) act 1989 s 2 Law of Property Act 1925 s25 Pettit v Pettit AC 777 Gissing v Gissing AC 886 Eves v Eves 1 WLR 1338 Grant v Edwards 1 Ch 638 Midland Bank PLC v Cooke 4 ALL ER 562. Cooke v Head 1 WLR 518 Eves v Eves Hall v Hall 3 FLR 379 Hussey v Palmer 1 WLR 1286 Burns v Burns 1 Ch 317 Lloyds TSB bank v Rossett 1 AC 107 The wife claimed that she had a beneficial interest in theproperty under a constructive trust and this took effect as anoverriding interest binding on the bank under LRA 1925 s70(1)(g).There was not enough for detrimental reliance in an express intention,let alone sufficient to support an inferred agreement. Oxley v Hiscock 2004 EWCA Civ 546 Springette v Defoe (1992) 2 FLR 388 Payne v Webb (1874) LR 19 Eq 26). Goodman v Gallant Fam 106 Re 88 Berkley Road 1971 CH 648 Kinch v Bullard 1999 1 WLR 423 Williams v Hensman (1861) 1 John & H 546 Burgess v Rawnsley Ch 429 Harris v Goddard 1 WLR Target Holdings Ltd v Redfern 1995 3 WLR 352 Nestle v Nat west Bank 1994 1 ALL ER 118 Bray v Ford (1986) AC 44 Keech v Sandford 1926 Sel Cas Temp King 61 Wright v Morgan 1926 AC 788 Kane v Radley – Kane 1998 3 ALL ER 753 Walsh v Deloitte and Touche 2001 ALL ER 326 Boardman v Phipps 2 AC 46 AG for Hong Kong v Reid 1994 1 AC 324 Re Diplock Ch 456 Re Flower (1884) 27 ChD592 Bahin v Hughes 1886 31 Chd 390 Armitage v Nurse Ch 241 Re Paulings 1964 ch 303 Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan 1995 3 ALL ER 97 Gruppo Torras v Al Sabah CA 2000 ALL ER 1643 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale and FC Jones and sons 2 AC 548 Agip Ltd v Jackson Ch 547