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The Law About the Shared Home Essay

The common law favours the imposition of strict formality requirements
on land transactions. If LP (MP) act 1989 s2 is not complied with
there is no contract. Without a deed Legal estates and interests
cannot be created or transferred under the LPA 1925 S52(1). Trusts
of land can only be created by signed declarations in writing LPA 1925
s53(1)(b). The strictness of these requirements can sometimes ends in
injustice, notably where relationships break down and the ownership of
the property they share comes under scrutiny. This is outlined in the
Discussion paper of shared homes. The decisions in some cases in this
area of law has led to confusion.

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The paper comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to have a
statutory framework in this area, and we must see if the decision in
Hiscock has clarified this. In the Journal of social welfare and
family law, an article titled ‘a law commission discussion paper with
a difference’ is the criticism of the law commission discussion paper
examining the legal rights of cohabitants in property. It states it
‘regrets its lack of consultation and its failure to make suggestions
for reform and its adoption of a property law rather than a family law
approach to the problem’.

Previous cases, before Oxley have been contradictory in there nature
and have never set a conclusive framework. Under the LPA 1925 S53 (1)
(b) an express trust is unenforceable unless evidenced in writing but
s53 (2) provides that this requirement does not affect the operation
of resulting, implied or constructive trusts. In the previous cases it
was the imposition of these trusts that caused the confusion.

In the early 1970’s, the House of Lords had to consider two cases in
which the claim of a divorced spouse to a share in the family home,
was not based on financial contribution, but on the work done in the
house (Pettit v Pettit), and on relatively minor contributions to
household expenses (Gissing v Gissing). This latter case is
important and set out the requirements for the modern common intention
trust.

In Gissing, Lord Diplock set out that there was a two stage in
establishing a common intention trust of this sort .1) an agreement 2)
some detrimental reliance on this agreement. There must be agreement
between the parties at the time the property was acquired and that the
partner without the legal estate is to have beneficial interest in the
land. Such an agreement can be made in writing or orally, which the
court may still be able to infer agreement from the conduct of one of
the parties. Inferred intention may be by, contribution to mortgage
instalments, price of property, deposit or legal charges, indirect
mortgage payments such as paying bills to free money up of the
mortgage payer.

If the agreement is made in writing as mentioned above the agreement
would constitute a declaration of trust for the purposes of LPA 1925
S53 (1)(b). Some cases illustrating written agreement are Eves v Eves,
and Grant v Edwards. If the agreement made orally or it had to be
inferred from conduct it would be unenforceable unless the court could
find in implied, resulting or constructive trust, an example of this
would be Midland Bank v Cooke.

Diplock’s second requirement that the claimant had been induced to act
to their detriment in belief that they are acquiring an interest. In
Gissing this is suggested could be the same as those noted above from
which an agreement may be inferred, but in later decision it was
accepted a wider range of contribution which did not involve financial
contribution.

In the case of Gissing the House of Lords considered there was no
evidence of any express agreement between the parties at the time the
house was bought and nor were the contributions of the wife sufficient
to support the interference of a common intention. There was no
beneficial interest.

The immediate result (of the court of appeal decision where the
actions of the wife were accepted), of this decision was an increase
use of this non express trust to achieve a fair result between parties
when a strict application of legal rules would appear inequitable.
Lord Denning, who had his own interpretation of Gissing read Lord
Diplocks words as authorising the use of the new model constructive
trust wherever it was equitable to do so. However in view of the more
restrictive approach adopted by the Court of Appeal from the mid
1980’s onwards in now seems improbable that Lord Denning’s broad
approach will have much influence today. Accordingly these are a few
of his decisions. These are four cases where in an unmarried situation
they upheld the plaintiffs claim to a share in the house owned by the
partner. These claims would be an unlikely occurrence today. Cooke v
Head, Eves v Eves, Hall v Hall, Hussey v Palmer.

A Change of approach was again adopted, as mentioned above, in the mid
80’s, seen in Burns v Burns when an unmarried couple had been
living together for 19yrs – she cared for the kids and paid the bills
and it was held not to be an inferred common intention. On the
approach adopted by Lord Denning (eg Hall v Hall) one would have
thought these facts would have amounted to some sort of implied trust,
but the Court of Appeal followed Diplock’s views in Gissing
emphasising need for agreement.

The change is also shown in the case of Lloyds TSB bank v Rossett
where the husband bought house with trust money. The result may
well have restated the decision in Gissing, but the second paragraph,
of the need for direct contribution seems to limit the scope of the
principles as so far understood, and to rule out the indirect
contribution to mortgage repayments by meeting household expenses
which was accepted in Gissing and Burns.

It is in describing the confusion of past law, that we must look at
the most recent case of Oxley v Hiscock- an unmarried couple
separated and the ownership of the house again came into question. The
result was that they ‘got out what they put’ although the woman made
contributions in other ways. The lady wanted a constructive trust to
arise and therefore get equal shares. The judge must look at the view
of overall fairness so although cohabitation had involved a classic
pooling of resources, Hiscock’s greater financial contribution had to
be take into account and an equal split would therefore not be fair.
If there is a common intention to share, must look at whole course of
dealing.

The question is whether this decision has clarified the somewhat
unstable law that has been occurring previously. A Journal Article
Titled ‘Property rights in a family home’ from the Family Law journal
welcomes the Court of Appeal decision in Oxley which clarifies the
principles to be applied when deciding upon the property interests in
the family home in the absence of an express agreement as to its
division. It contrasts the previously conflicting approaches in
Springette v Defoe where the property was divided into proportions
equal to the parties’ contributions and considered Midland v Cooke
where it was held that the parties’ total conduct relating to the
property would be taken in to account in deciding a fair decision.

It seems that the case has given stability to some extent in decisions
in shared homes when separation occurs, as the recent decision in
Oxley states that the whole course of dealing must be looked at and
the result must be fair. In Gissing it was decided that after 30 years
of marriage there should be no beneficial interest, which surely was
not fair. Although there are now some guidelines that have arisen from
this case, I would conclude that the clarification of the law is only
to a certain extent as the aggrieved party may sill feel cheated after
a long period of marriage and only a small share of the house.

Part 2

Scenario

Question 1 – Will the Children’s trust fund include any share in
Ryburn?

Mohan and Wendy have bought Ryburn which is a large house for £350000
and they were beneficial joint tenants with no restrictions were
entered onto the proprietorship register. Wendy contributed £175 000
towards the purchase price, Mohan £100000 and they borrowed £75000.
The express declaration of trust in the transfer deed is conclusive as
to the nature of their co-ownership (and would be as to the size of
their respective shares in the case of a Tenancy in Common).

They are both in legal ownership. To enter in a joint tenancy Wendy
would have been aware that although she put in more of the money, if
they were ever to sever the Joint tenancy she would only receive half
of the trust property rather than the 60% that she put in unless
expressly declared otherwise. They own the property together, not in
shares. As joint tenants there were four unities that must have
existed when entering in to the tenancy. These are Time Title interest
and possession. This means that they should vest in the property at
the same time, have acquired the title of the property by the same
means, their interests must be the same and they must be equally
entitled to the possession. A crucial aspect of the joint tenancy
means there is a right of survivorship or jus accrescendi on the death
of one of the parties which means the surviving party would inherit
the whole of the trust property. It cannot be disposed of in a will to
someone else, nor will it pass on intestacy if no will is made. The
last survivor becomes the sole beneficiary.

A tenancy in common means the parties hold a share of the property,
usually the amount of money they put into the purchase price. In this
situation only one unity is needed, and that is the unity of
possession, however there can be other unities present. If possession
did not exist there would be no co ownership. It allows a notional
share of the property. If all the unities are present, ‘words of
severance’ may indicate a Tenancy in Common. This means the agreement
of co-ownership would contain words such as ‘in equal shares’ or
equally’ as in the case of Payne v Webb.

It is the ‘right of survivorship’ that is the important aspect
regarding the children’s share in Ryburn. If Mohan and Wendy were
still joint tenants when Mohan died the property will belong to Wendy
as Mohan will not have been able to leave it in a will to his
children. If they were Tenants in common, the children would receive
half share or the equivalent to the amount Mohan put in to the
purchase of the house.

Wendy has met Peter and they have fallen in love, and they would like
to move in together. All Wendy’s money is tied up in her share of the
house and so she has emailed him asking to buy her share and if he
won’t agree to then put the house on the market and split the price
equally. This would mean a severance of the joint tenancy and this
principle is shown in the case of Goodman v Gallant. A primary
reason for severance of a joint tenancy is to avoid the effects of the
right of survivorship. Due to the Law of Property Act 1925 S36(2) it
is not possible to sever a legal joint tenancy, this is, however
possible in Equity, making the tenancy a Tenancy in Common. This is
affected in a number of ways set out in the proviso of s 36(2).

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In this case we must therefore establish if there has been severance
of the joint tenancy making it a tenancy in common and this will
decide what share the children recieve a share in Ryburn. This would
mean showing if the email has amounted to severance of this joint
tenancy, which if it has would mean that Wendy cannot receive the full
property on right of survivorship but only a share of the property,
therefore leaving Mohan’s children with the rest.

There are several ways of severing a joint tenancy. The first way is
by notice in writing. It is then necessary to decide whether the email
that Wendy sent to Mohan could be classed as a notice in writing as
Mohan did not actually read the email before he died. Due to this we
should make reference to Land Property Act s 196. The LPA 196(4) sets
out that severance letters left at the last known ‘place of abode or
address’ are sufficient notice. If this service is adopted it is
irrelevant that the owner does not in fact receive knowledge of the
notice as shown in the case of Re 88 Berkley Road. Alternatively
the notice can be sent by registered post and if not returned
undelivered LPA 196(3) (as shown in Kinch v Bullard) can be held
to be severance by notice in writing. If this was to apply here then
there would be severance due to this email, as it was left at Mohan’s
last know email address which is obviously still in use as Mohan
decided not to read the email before he went to his dinner. It could
also be argued that is was registered when it was sent, as all emails
can be traced and it was not returned undelivered as a failed delivery
report would have been sent to Wendy’s inbox.

It is also possible to sever a joint tenancy by ‘acts of other
things’. Williams v Hensman set out the requirements for severance
of a Joint tenancy in this manner. This could be by ‘An act operating
upon his own share’ for example on sale, mutual agreement, or
forfeiture. In this situation there could be severance by mutual
agreement. As both parties have discussed for the past couple of
months to sell the house this could also amount to severance by mutual
agreement. Mutual agreement occurs in the case of Burgess v Rawnsley.

Finally there must also be a clear intention to sever immediately as
in Harris v Goddard. This is stated in the email as Wendy wants
everything to be sorted as soon as possible and therefore put on the
market right away.

It may be said that this does not amount to severance as the LPA s196
does not apply to emails and it is not deemed to be held as severance
by notice in writing as the email was not read before Mohan died. In
my opinion looking at the facts and applying the law, I would say that
the tenancy has been severed and therefore leaving the children
Mohan’s share of the property.

Question 2 – What legal issues are raised by Maria’s acquisition of a
25% shareholding in VPC ltd?

Mohan, before he died had set up a pharmaceutical company with his
cousin Raman and his sister Pushpa and has died a wealthy man. He left
his entire estate to his three children Sachin who is 24, poppy who is
20, 21 in April and Rahul who is 16, and they must receive the money
when they reach 30 years old. Raman, Pushpa and Maria, Mohan’s
solicitor are the trustees.

The trustees have taken over a pharmaceuticals company called VPC, and
Maria after telling the other Trustees, has bought some shares in VPC
realising that after the takeover they will probably increase in
price. The trustees must do the best for the trust property and invest
money wisely. The decision to sell the shares to Maria is therefore an
investment decision which the trustees should make. If it transpires
that they should not have sold the shares, or sold them earlier to
make a profit then the beneficiaries may have an action for breach of
trust. They will have to show that there was a breach which was a
failure to exercise reasonable care and skill in managing investments
and that breach has caused a loss. Target Holdings Ltd v Redfern.
A case where there was insufficient care in the investment is in the
case of Nestle v Nat west Bank.

The fact that Maria has bought the shares is another matter
altogether. As outlined in Bray v Ford there is an inflexible rule
on persons in a fiduciary duty that they can not make a profit and
they are not allowed to put themselves ‘in a position where his
interest and duty conflict’. Where any person in a fiduciary position
obtains a profit or gain by virtue of that position he may not keep it
for himself but will be liable for it to the person to whom he is a
fiduciary.

How do we know if there is a fiduciary relationship? The most obvious
is that of a trustee and beneficiary, it is clear that a trustee must
not put there personal interests in conflict with those of the trust.
This principle is shown in the case of Keech v Sandford. The
particular fiduciary relationship in this case is beneficiary and
trustee, but in the course of time the principle of fiduciary
relationships has been extended to other fiduciary relationships such
as agents, tenants for life, tenancy in Common and Joint tenants.

This means Maria is in a fiduciary relationship and is in breach of
her duty as the purchase of trust property by a trustee invokes the
rule against self dealing, a specific application of the overriding
fiduciary obligation not to profit from the fiduciary position or put
oneself in a position where personal interest and a duty to the
beneficiaries may conflict. The core principles of fiduciary
obligation in a contempory context are set out in the judgement of
Bristol & West building society v Mothew . In any event it does
not matter if the trustees put their own interests before that of the
trusts because they are in breach of their fiduciary duty by putting
themselves in a position where there may be a conflict of interest
even though there is no actual conflict.

Even if Maria does not make a profit and she bought the shares at a
fair price and making the other trustees aware, this is still self
dealing and the transaction can be set aside at the request of the
beneficiary as illustrated in Wright v Morgan and Kane v Radley –
Kane. The profit made can also be recovered and kept by the
beneficiary as the original money was the beneficiaries.

It is a breach of a fiduciary duty if a person in a fiduciary position
makes a profit from the use of knowledge or economic opportunity
gained by the virtue of their position, the rule applies even if they
acted bone fide. Maria has misused her knowledge of the company and
the shares and knowing their price will increase after the takeover of
VPC, therefore benefiting herself, as illustrated in Walsh v Deloitte
and Touche and Boardman v Phipps.

There are two basic kinds of remedies available in equity to prevent
a fiduciary from profiting. The proprietary remedy is to make the
unfair gain the subject matter of the trust. This mechanism and its
effect were explained in AG for Hong Kong v Reid in the context of
bribes and as soon as the bribe was received whether in cash or in
kind, the false fiduciary held the bribe on constructive trust for the
person injured. The other remedy which the fiduciary may be deprived
of his unfair gain is to make him personally accountable for it to the
person(s) they are fiduciary to. This is a personal remedy and they
must give up an amount equivalent to the gain, no specific property is
made subject to the trust.

In our scenario I think the shares are now held on constructive trust
for the beneficiaries. Also as there has been a considerable profit
made the beneficiaries can insist the shares are resold on the open
market and the profit transferred to them. The beneficiaries could
also have the purchase set aside and the property recovered plus any
income the shares have made in the meantime, or can insist the shares
being resold on the open market.

It may be said that there can be no defences to the trustees here, as
none of the beneficiaries are Sui Juris and could agree to this self
dealing. Boardman v Phipps shows this scenario well and their
investment in shares was unauthorised even though the other trustees
know about it, they had not fully disclosed it to the beneficiaries.
Maria may say they are acting bone fide in good faith; however she
would have known that she would be gaining from her knowledge and this
would be likely to fail. In a proprietary remedy there is strict
liability for ones own acts or omissions even if acting in good faith.
Simpson 1951.A Trustee, or other person in a fiduciary position, is
personally liable for his breach of trust of fiduciary duty, or in
appropriate cases, for a proprietary remedy. As seen in the case of Re
Diplock . Maria will therefore be liable and the shares dealt with
in the manner the beneficiaries think correct.

Question 3 – Advise the three children as to whether Maria, Raman or
anybody else may be liable to compensate them for the losses caused by
the withdrawals.

Pushpa who is experiencing cash flow problems has started to dip into
the trust fund at Krishna bank to tide her over. She has withdrawn
£10000 from the trust account to buy her daughter a wedding present,
she withdrew another £50000 and put it in to her own account and on
the advice of her investment consultant frank she withdrew £150000 to
invest in Far Eastern securities.

As Maria and Raman knew at some point about what has been going on
and they have not done anything about it. Also they have not paid much
attention to the trust over the past year as they have been overseeing
other projects. Therefore if there has been a breach of trust they
will be jointly and severally liable for the loss. Trustees cannot
allow trust property to be under exclusive control of one of their
number so therefore Maria and Raman must make it their duty to know
what is going on at all times. The trust must remain under control of
them all and it could be said that control has passed as they were not
keeping an eye on trust money and therefore they have committed a
breach of trust. The case of Re Flower states, ‘the duty of
trustees is to prevent one of themselves having the exclusive control
over the money, and certainly not, by any act of theirs, to enable one
of themselves to have exclusive control over it’.

Even if it was not proved that Raman and Maria allowed Pushpa full
control over the money, the trustees are still likely to be joint and
severally liable. A trustee cannot avoid liability for an
administrative breach on the basis that they played no active part as
in Bahin v Hughes. It is a default of the trustee to fail to
supervise the actions of a co trustee, or to stand by while a co
trustee commits a breach of trust. The trustee must restore to the
trust the assets lost by reason of the breach, or pay the trust
sufficient to make up for the loss. The amount of loss is calculated
at the date of judgement. The Trustee Act 1925 s30(1) provides that no
trustee shall be answerable for the acts of the other trustees unless
the same happens by their own wilful default.

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It is necessary for the beneficiaries that Raman and Maria’s breach
had a sufficient causative link to the loss to establish liability.
There is no liability unless there is a loss and a breach that caused
the loss as in Target v Redfern. We know there is a breach as Pushpa
has stolen the money and the other trustees may have caused this as
they were not giving their full attention to the trust.

Several defences used by the trustees are, although not stated here,
there may be an exemption clause that states the money can be used for
their own benefit if fully replaced. However this is unlikely and
Pushpa took the money for her own use because she was short of money.
Exemption clauses are demonstrated in the case of Armitage v Nurse.
With an appropriately drafted clause trustees can exempt themselves
from anything short of outright dishonesty. However in this case I
would say it is outright dishonesty. If actions by the beneficiaries
to recover trust property are taken after 6 years from the breach then
the right of action will have ceased. This is under the limitation act
1980 s 32(1). We will presume that the length of time in which the
beneficiaries brought action was less than six years and therefore
this cannot be used as a defence.

The consent of a beneficiary who is ‘Sui Juris’ and with full
knowledge consents to or requests to a breach of trust cannot claim
against the trustee for example Re Paulings. However in this
situation there is no evidence that the beneficiaries were consenting.

If it appears to the court that the trustee has acted honestly,
reasonably and ought to be fairly excused for a breach of trust or for
omitting to obtain the directions of the court then the court may
relieve the trustee wholly of partly (Trustee Act s61). Also the fact
that Trustees have acted upon legal advice does not necessarily mean
they will be excused under s61. This would mean the advice from Frank
would not necessarily negate liability. However it is unlikely in any
event that Pushpa would be found acting honestly by her actions.

It may be proved that Frank as a stranger to the trust may be liable
to compensate the losses which would help recover some of the money
that has been lost. Accessory liability is formally known as “knowing
assistance”. This ground for liability exists where a third party
dishonestly participates in a breach of trust by procuring it or
facilitating it. The primary problem is the meaning of dishonest in
this context. Accessory liability is outlined in Royal Brunei Airlines
v Tan. The issues in this case are whether a third party would be
liable for assisting an innocent breach of trust? And what type of
conduct gives rise to third party liability.

There is a trust that has arisen as Frank is Pushpa’s investment
consultant, and is guiding her with her financial matters. In this
case this is not an innocent breach of trust as Pushpa knows exactly
what she is doing stealing the money for her own benefit. Frank also
knows what is going on and therefore assists the dishonesty and
invested in Far Eastern securities. This shows this his breach caused
the loss, Target v Redfern.

The test for accessory liability is an objective test with a
subjective element. Not acting as an honest person would be an
objective standard and the subjective element would be what honest and
reasonable persons of honest conduct would do in light of what the
defendant knew at the time rather than what an honest and reasonable
person would have known at the time. Turning a blind eye would also be
dishonest (Nelsonian) as stated in Gruppo Torras v Al Sabah.
Franks liability depends on his state of mind. So is Frank being
dishonest at the time? If Frank is guilty, a constructive trust is
imposed upon them and the likely view is that Frank will be personally
liable to account to the beneficiaries for the amount of loss to the
estate which would be the £150000 that Frank advised her about. Frank
may plead honesty and say he didn’t know where the money was coming
from, but would the court think he was reasonable in doing so?

Using a proprietary remedy some of the original money may be able to
be traced. If the money is dissipated then it cannot be traced. This
may be the case for the £10000 that was spent on Pushpa’s daughters
wedding present. Tracing is locating the property in its original form
the beneficiaries seeking to recover it. It is also the process of
identifying the value that now represents your original asset. For
example if the wrongdoer has sold your asset you may be able to
recover the money which now represents your asset which in this case
would be the money from the shares. There is common law tracing, where
the claimant is the legal owner of the trust property, and the
claimants assets have been passed to someone else unlawfully. This can
only be traced if it is in an unchanged form and has not been mixed up
with anything else. This is shown in the case of Lipkin Gorman v
Karpnale and FC Jones and sons where it could be traced directly
into shares. The money can still be returned even if it has been
invested. However the money cannot be traced in to a mixed bank
account at common law which is what regularly happens. The money must
be claimed in equity if it has been mixed up in used bank accounts.
The £500000 that was finally transferred into Pushpa’s bank may be
fully recovered if none of it has been spent and there is enough money
in her bank to replace it, even if it takes some of her own money. In
equity there must be a fiduciary relationship and the money or
property has been lost through a breach of fiduciary duty. Agip Ltd v
Jackson. Therefore the money transferred into Pushpa’s own bank
account may be recoverable through tracing. Any withdrawals are
counted as withdrawing her own money first.

In conclusion, Pushpa has stolen the money and is liable to pay back
the losses to the trust. As the money has been used purely by Pushpa
for her own benefit on the principle of unjust enrichment, she could
be held liable to restore the entire amount without any contribution
from the other trustees. However this may be of little practical value
to the beneficiaries as it is unlikely that Pushpa has sufficient
funds to reimburse the full amount. However if it is proved that Maria
and Raman also played a part in the breach of trust, they will be
jointly and severally liable with all the trustees. Frank as a
stranger to the trust may also be found to be a cause of the breach
and be liable for losses. If some of the money can be traced with a
proprietary remedy that that may be found useful by the trustees. In
any event the money needs to be recovered whether if is from Frank or
the trustees who will be jointly and severally liable, or through
tracing.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

* Pettit v Pettit [1970 AC 777

* Gissing v Gissing AC 886

* Eves v Eves 1 WLR 1338

* Grant v Edwards 1 Ch 638

* Midland Balk PLC v Cooke 4 ALL ER 562

* Cooke v Head 1 WLR 518

* Eves v Eves [1975 1 WLR 1338

* Hall v Hall 3 FLR 379

* Hussey v Palmer 1 WLR 1286

* Burns v Burns 1 Ch 317

* Lloyds TSB bank v Rossett 1 AC 107

* Oxley v Hiscock 2004 EWCA Civ 546

* Springette v Defoe (1992) 2 FLR 388

* Gillett v Holt Ch 210

* Barlow, A. (2003) Sharing homes: a Law Commission Discussion paper
with a difference. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law ,
25(1), 83-96. Available from:

* Payne v Webb (1874) LR 19 Eq 26)

* Goodman v Gallant Fam 106

* Re 88 Berkley Road 1971 CH 648

* Kinch v Bullard 1999 1 WLR 423

* Williams v Hensman (1861) 1 John & H 546

* Burgess v Rawnsley Ch 429

* Harris v Goddard 1 WLR

* Target Holdings Ltd v Redfern 1995 3 WLR 352

* Nestle v Nat west Bank 1994 1 ALL ER 118

* Bray v Ford (1986) AC 44

* Keech v Sandford 1926 Sel Cas Temp King 61

* Bristol & West building society v Mothew

* Wright v Morgan 1926 AC 788

* Kane v Radley – kane 1998 3 ALL ER 753

* AG for Hong Kong v Reid 1994 1 AC 324

* Re Diplock Ch 456

* Boardman v Phipps 1967 2 AC 46

* Re Flower (1884) 27 ChD592

* Bahin v Hughes 1886 31 chd 390

* Re Paulings 1964 ch 303

* Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan 1995 3 ALL ER 97

* Gruppo Torras v Al Sabah CA 2000 ALL ER 1643

* Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale and FC Jones and sons 2 AC 548

* Agip Ltd v Jackson Ch 547

* Westlaw (2005) Westlaw online
http://web2.westlaw.com/signon/default.wl?bhcp=1&newdoor=true
December/January 04/05

* Lawtel (2005) Lawtel Online Available from
http://www.lawtel.com/ [accessed December/January 2004/2005

* Edwards, R. Stockwell, N. Trusts and Equity. Sixth Edition,
Pearson Longman Publishers.

* Phillips, M. Mackenzie, JA. Textbook on Land Law. Ninth Edition,
Oxford University Press.

* Leeds Metropolitan Lecture Notes

* Edwards, S. (2004) Property rights in a family Home. Family Law
Journal , January, pp 524-527, Available from:<
www.lawtel.co.uk> .

———————————————————————

Law of Property (Miscellaneous provisions) act 1989 s 2

Law of Property Act 1925 s25

Pettit v Pettit AC 777

Gissing v Gissing AC 886

Eves v Eves 1 WLR 1338

Grant v Edwards 1 Ch 638

Midland Bank PLC v Cooke 4 ALL ER 562.

Cooke v Head 1 WLR 518

Eves v Eves [1975 1 WLR 1338

Hall v Hall 3 FLR 379

Hussey v Palmer 1 WLR 1286

Burns v Burns 1 Ch 317

Lloyds TSB bank v Rossett 1 AC 107

The wife claimed that she had a beneficial interest in the
property under a constructive trust and this took effect as an
overriding interest binding on the bank under LRA 1925 s70(1)(g).
There was not enough for detrimental reliance in an express intention,
let alone sufficient to support an inferred agreement.

Oxley v Hiscock 2004 EWCA Civ 546

Springette v Defoe (1992) 2 FLR 388

Payne v Webb (1874) LR 19 Eq 26).

Goodman v Gallant Fam 106

Re 88 Berkley Road 1971 CH 648

Kinch v Bullard 1999 1 WLR 423

Williams v Hensman (1861) 1 John & H 546

Burgess v Rawnsley Ch 429

Harris v Goddard 1 WLR

Target Holdings Ltd v Redfern 1995 3 WLR 352

Nestle v Nat west Bank 1994 1 ALL ER 118

Bray v Ford (1986) AC 44

Keech v Sandford 1926 Sel Cas Temp King 61

Wright v Morgan 1926 AC 788

Kane v Radley – Kane 1998 3 ALL ER 753

Walsh v Deloitte and Touche 2001 ALL ER 326

Boardman v Phipps 2 AC 46

AG for Hong Kong v Reid 1994 1 AC 324

Re Diplock Ch 456

Re Flower (1884) 27 ChD592

Bahin v Hughes 1886 31 Chd 390

Armitage v Nurse Ch 241

Re Paulings 1964 ch 303

Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan 1995 3 ALL ER 97

Gruppo Torras v Al Sabah CA 2000 ALL ER 1643

Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale and FC Jones and sons 2 AC 548

Agip Ltd v Jackson Ch 547

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The Law About the Shared Home Essay
Artscolumbia
Artscolumbia
The common law favours the imposition of strict formality requirements on land transactions. If LP (MP) act 1989 s2[1] is not complied with there is no contract. Without a deed Legal estates and interests cannot be created or transferred under the LPA 1925 S52(1)[2]. Trusts of land can only be created by signed declarations in writing LPA 1925 s53(1)(b). The strictness of these requirements can sometimes ends in injustice, notably where relationships break down and the ownership of the pr
2019-04-18 06:41:52
The Law About the Shared Home Essay
$ 13.900 2018-12-31
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