In the Second Analogy, Kant also explains what makes it possible to infer the objective succession from the subjective succession. He argues that objective succession must stand under a causal rule. The subjective order of perceptions is always successive, but we cannot immediately infer objective succession from the subjective succession. To make this inference possible the object’s states must be subject to a rule that determines them as successive. Kant mentions this requirement in the following paragraph.
“must therefore consist in the order of the manifold of appearance in accordance
with which the apprehension of one thing (that which happens) follows that of
the other (which precedes it) in accordance with a rule. Only thereby can I be
justified in saying of the appearance itself, and not merely of my apprehension,
that a sequence is to be encountered in it.” (A193/B238)
Then, he characterizes this rule as something that always and necessarily follows. Also, this rule must make the
progress from a given time to the determinately following one possible, and necessarily relate every perception to something else in general that precedes. Accordingly, the successive states of an object must include a relation of condition to conditioned, i.e.
, that of the causal dependence of successive states on a cause6; consequently, the rule is a causal rule. Kant explains the argument for the claim that we can have knowledge about objective succession if the successive states of the object stands under a causal rule in the following passage.
“In accordance with such a rule there must therefore lie in that which
in general precedes an occurrence the condition for a rule, in accordance with which this occurrence always and . .. David Hume.
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Lewis White Beck (1978). Essays on Kant and Hume. Yale University Press.
Arthur Melnick (1973). Kant’s Analogies of Experience.
Chicago,University of Chicago Press.
Gerd Buchdahl (1969). Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Graham Bird (1973). Kant’s Theory of Knowledge.
New York, Humanities Press.
Henry E. Allison (2004). Kant’s Transcendental Idealism. Yale University Press.
Allison (1981). Transcendental Schematism and The Problem of the Synthetic A Priori. Dialectica 35 (1):57-83.
Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena and metaphysical foundations of natural science.
Immanuel Kant (2007). Critique of pure reason.
In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Blackwell Pub. Ltd..